by natural laws. Issues pertaining to natural law in Locke are not settled at the ontological level, nor at the level of epistemic capacities; rather, I believe, their precise significance in Locke's political thought is vitiated at a cognitive level, that is, by human beings who do not stay the course even after reason has acknowl edged it, and this because of the "unsteadiness" of reason. Given this fact, Locke's pedagogical project, with its focused attention on molding children's minds by making them acutely sensitive to matters of reputation and authority, has a direct bearing on the viability of natural law as a tenable normative order.
Below the Threshold: Liberals and Communitarians
In recent Anglo-American political theorizing, discussions of the self have assumed a special poignance. The critical interchange between liberals and communitarians often centers on the con trasting characterizations of the self, from which are drawn wider points of contrasts. This book was not conceived or writ ten in light of these contemporary discussions among liberals and communitarians. It was meant, and ultimately this is all I claim for it, as an interpretive essay on Locke's political thought which selectively draws on most of Locke's major writings to illustrate a particular anxiety about the natural self that underlies them. Even within this arena, my aims are considerably nar rower than many works that exclusively focus on one thinker. I do not systematically consider the progression in Locke's thought from his early Essays on Na tural Law to his mature works, nor do I distinctly deal with his views on religion, revolution, toleration, money, language, epistemology, or metaphysics. I do not discuss the contentious issue of how best to interpret a thinker such as Locke: whether to locate him within the admit tedly epochal context of seventeenth-century England as a peer to the great personages and intellectuals of his times, or as a conspiratorial pamphleteer whose concerns were mainly those of a political strategist buffeted by local constraints, or as a philoso pher who wrote sub sp ecie aeternitatis in the great tradition that includes Plato, Kant, and Hegel. On this latter issue, a resolute methodological indifference commits me to say nothing in ad vance. In any case, there is no denying that by now Locke has become an icon who sustains a polytheistic church.
Notwithstanding these denials, my argument does, I believe, in a limited manner offer a distinct perspective on the liberal communitarian debate. Isaiah Berlin's famous "Two Concepts of Liberty" supplies a helpful way to characterize many of the issues involved in this debate. Berlin distinguishes two concep tions of liberty, negative and positive. The former, which Berlin indicates is an expressly "political liberty, " defines "the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others." Echoing the argument of Mill's On Liberty, Berlin's principle proscribes a deliberate interference from and toward others and is hence not for the most part limited by personal capacities and talents. In contrast, the positive conception of liberty consists in being "conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by refer ence to my own ideas and purposes"; in brief, it requires self mastery and self-control, and therefore its existence or failure turns on internal grounds. 31
The qualification in the previous paragraph-"for the most part"-is important to interpret correctly both Berlin and the liberal-communitarian debate he helps elucidate. Negative, or political, liberty is not wholly independent of human capacities and attributes. Its normative ascription is not therefore unrelated to a specification of certain human talents, even though these specifications are meant to define a minimum rather than a J J Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty, " in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 122, 131.
higher threshold. Thus, even for negative liberty Berlin specifies certain minimum conditions of rationality and deliberative com petence that must be met before someone is considered politi cally free. Insanity, delirium, and hypnotic trance are all condi tions that explicitly disqualify an agent from this freedom. 3 2 Put differently, even political liberty does not merely turn on the possession of certain capacities but on the actual and competent exercise of these capacities. 33
Berlin is explicit that positive liberty requires a more richly developed set of talents and virtues, which in turn are the basis of more valuable ends, including for instance a sense of social solidarity. His point is to distinguish political freedom from a freedom that is the basis of various other valuable goods that require a higher threshold of rationality and self-control. It is the conflation of these two freedoms that Berlin is objecting to-and not to the fact that positive liberty does bring with it perhaps a richer set of ends. But both liberties are contingent and hence not absolute, they are contingent on different sets of talents requir ing at a minimum a certain level of rationality. Between the talents requisite for negative freedom and those for wholly delib erative and autonomous action associated with Kant, the range is considerable and the political visions associated with this range similarly extensive.
Berlin amounts to a metaphysic of the authentic self that has, as an underlying core, an implausible degree of internal equanimity, self-knowledge, and other cognitive assets. Free action is ul timately the action of this already empowered self. Taylor's communitarianism is that of autonomous individuals unburdened by the hindrances of narrow, unreflective, silly, or shallow pleasures. Even when these pleasures are experienced as moments of freedom, they do not vindicate the self, a self Taylor wants to identify with actors who manifest an unerring self reftective authenticity. There is a strange mix of psychological naivete and political ambivalence in Taylor's communitarian project. His "self, " to whom the adjective "true" is appropriately added, is free not only of transient desires, facile needs, uncon trolled urges but also of spontaneity. 35 Indeed, spontaneity, which is valorized by theorists of individuality such as Nietzsche and Emerson, is seen by Taylor as the mark of a fundamental absence of self-control, discipline, and deliberation. 36 The pro file of this individual appears sculpted by the hyperrationalism of a philosopher's experience. As for his political ambivalence, on the one hand Ta ylor denies people the right to lead what he calls truncated lives; we cannot "sensibly claim the morality of a truncated form of life for people on the grounds of defending their rights ."37 On the other hand, he does not, at least not explicitly, permit the highly interventionist measures that on his own account would be required to overcome the plethora of the Human Sciences: Philosophic Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Introduction 29 internal obstacles that stand in the way of the self-realization of the true self.
For Sandel, the objections to liberalism derive from the gulf it opens between persons and their ends, goals, and commitments to others. It is a gulf that has its basis in the deontological presumption of individual identity that is free from the aims and attachments of individuals. For such liberals, "identity is un problematically assured."38 All the attributes of such identity stand at a distance from it and hence have the character of possessions. 39 In contrast to this possessive self, which stands at a distance from its attributes because it holds them as mere possessions, Sandel offers a self constituted by commitments, attachments and situations. This situated self draws its identity from the commitments and associations with which it is, in an almost literal sense, infused. In contrast to the impersonality that liberalism, according to Sandel, encourages and the dis tances between and within individuals it engenders, the situated self seeks its identity from "those aims and attachments from which it cannot stand apart." These constitutive attachments "become more and more me and less mine. "40 Sandel's offers this critique to diminish the distance liberalism creates between the self and its goals and ends. In valorizing constitutive attachments, Sandel would have us discover who we are by acknowledging the attachments that make us who we are. Instead of viewing these attachments with the impersonality that needs to possess them as "mine," they are to be seen as constitu tive of "me." Sandel's is a truly non-Lockean world, but it is so not so much because of what it proposes but rather what it 3 8 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 179. 39 It is worth considering whether this view corresponds more closely to Rawls's view, as Sandel would have it, or rather to Ta ylor's "true self." 40 Sandel, Liberalism and Limits, pp. 182, 56 . See Kymlicka, Liberalism, Com munity, and Culture, for a sustained critique of the idea that one cannot stand critically apart from the allegedly constitutive attachments of the self.
presupposes-and in the critical potential it denies. Locke's indi viduals, one assumes, would also cherish these well-agluttenated identities that are confirmed by the knowledge of one's constitu tive attachments, of one's kinship bonds and shared sentiments . But Locke's individuals, like us, though being informed and supported by these prenatal horizons, could stand apart from them, critically evaluate them, and, despite the inevitable pain and struggle involved in estranging oneself from one's inheri tance, also therefore utlimately reject them.
Locke has a ubiquitous presence in the debate between liberals and communitarians. He is taken to exemplify, in its original and hence decisive form, arguments in favor of negative liberty and the detachment and impersonality ascribed to liberalism by the communitarians. My purpose here is not to challenge or defend the interpretations of Locke on the basis of which these com mending and condemnatory ascriptions are made. As I have mentioned, I neither conceived nor wrote this book with this debate as its principal focus. Instead, I want to very briefly suggest the implications of my argument for the positions being debated among the liberals and communitarians and for Locke's place in this debate.
If I am correct in claiming that anxieties about cognitive disor der and madness are critical to Locke's institutional design, then clearly from the standpoint of this interpretation the idea of negative liberty understates what is involved in meeting the threshold for such liberty; if madness and delirium in the man ner that Locke understands them are pervasive and mundane features of the human condition, then one needs to take more seriously than Berlin does the problem of how human beings can be made to satisfy the contingent requirements implicit for polit ical freedom. For Locke, I believe, the correspondence between negative and positive liberty, and between political freedom and self-mastery, is ultimately untenable because self-mastery or self-control is required as a condition for negative liberty itself-
